One way to begin is by looking at the so-called "universals," which GST adherents assumed to apply to all organized systems. The biological heritage of GST, as opposed to the derivation of mechanistic thinking from physics, produced the "organic laws" of growth, differentiation, hierarchical order, dominance, control, and competition. Over time, so it was thought, these' could be translated into mathematical terms. Furthermore, so went the argument, GST easily could deal with associated, but somewhat dichotomous, concepts; "maintenance and change" could be incorporated, and so could "preservation of the system and internal conflict" [15, p. 196] . To be sure, these had to be balanced or reconciled; neither "change" nor "internal conflict" could be permitted to destroy the system. From all this we could search out "goals" on a system-by-system basis, and the principal one turned out to be "survival." This biological thinking led us to believe we could discover wholeness by comparing what happened in one system with what occurred in others, without considering how entire systems might affect each other. We could compare, in other words, a system of bacterial cells to a system of human beings (e.g., a formal organization), but without worrying all that much about how cells and humans affected each other. GST assumed, then, an infinite number of relatively "closed" systems, even while trumpeting its ability to deal with "open" ones. This led to a series of anomalies which are the focus of this essay and which have had the effect of pointing us backwards instead of providing us with a vision of the future.
GST advocates have been unable to see, because their paradigm provents them from seeing, that their a priori assumptions, especially those of hierarchy, concreteness, and competition, could have only the effect of preventing us from realizing the stated objectives of GST itself. Hierarchy, the assumption that all organized social interaction occurs between "superiors" and "subordinates," compels us to impersonalize our relation-Ships With each other, thus making it impossibie for us to realize our selves or beings. Concreteness, the notion that any given system can be defined' generally m terms of itself, encourages us to focus on the single organization and, m the bargain, forces us to accept a deterministic outlook which leaves little room fcr the individual. Competition, an assumption derived m seme measure frcm the mechanistic outlook of Adam Smith, returns us to the despised tradition we sought to escape. Finally, GST has been tied to laws of exponential growth which premise only the destruction of us all If we do not seek alternatives to it. The arguments follow in order.
Hferorchy, Post-Feudalism, and Alienation Given the assumption, or organic law, of hierarchy, GST advocates (and most of the rest of us) failed to notice that the earlier change of Western society from feudalism to post-feudalism made it impossible for us to avoid mechanistic concepts. Indeed, I argue here that the combination of post-feudalism and what we term "democracy" only reinforced the mechanistic tradition. It is not significant to decide when the shift from feudalism to post-feudalism occurred, aside from noting that it was after nation-states had been organized by monarchs who viewed their realms as private businesses and themselves as agents of the Almighty.^ Thomas Hobbes attempted to sever this connection between government and religion by arguing, in the seventeenth century, that the sovereign should be an absolute, impartial, impersonal, and artificial one (an individual or an assembly) which could maintain the peace by preventing humans from constantly warring with each other. If he said nothing about elections as we think of them now, his concept was secular and very modern-the "sovereign" was comprised of citizens acting out roles as rulers, not serving as agents of God.^ His notions of impersonality and artificiality were important ingredients of the shift to post-feudalism, and they are the guiding notions of contemporary organizations.
In feudal systems, superior-subordinate relationships were personal relationships; despite the degrading nature of these social ties, they included the notion that persons were mutually responsible to each other (lords should help serfs in need). Hobbes' artificial sovereign, while Louis XIV and Frederick the Great, the issue being how much of the original premise remlfns?
(Aristotle, Rousseau, et al), used the same organization theory, one identical to Hobbis comprised of citizens, could have no personal responsibilities for other citizens, and so it is in the common organizational forms of post-feudalism. All of us "act out" the specialized "roles" assigned us, thus transforming relationships between persons into interactions between nonpersons. What occurs in formally organized interaction turns out to be worse than simpie alienation; it is as if we simply did not exist at all. We have tended (mistakenly) to associate alienation only with industrial capitalism. Whatever Marx's contributions to social thought, he turned our attention toward relationships between ownership and labor rather than toward those between superiors and subordinates. We failed to see that hierarchy, division of labor, obedience, and command, were and are much more important than capitalism as the source of alienation. We are learning only now, perhaps a century after beginning to think about it, that a shift in ownership from "private" to "public" does nothing to alleviate alienation, because this change alone has no effect on hierarchy.B ecause we believe we seek equality, we constantly tell ourselves that we are free and independent citizens and that we associate with each other on that basis, but nonhierarchical association is possible only outside all formally organized social interaction. To preserve the fiction of "democracy," we end up reemphasizing the concept of "role," but this returns us to a mechanistic concept. As roles, we remain on our treadmills; even the status we acquire is assigned to our roles, not to our selves. In most cases (families, public agencies, corporations), we feel uncomfortable with this loss of our identities, so we seek to repersonalize our relationships with others, and GST provides some basis for doing so. This has the effect, unfortunately, of suspending us somewhere between feudalism and postfeudalism, and three examples illustrate the dangers therein. The Mafia emphasizes the "family," but its leaders make post-feudal istic decisions to remove certain individuals for the sake of family survival. Professional athletes are the feudalistic property of owners, but the latter make postfeudalistic decisions to dispose of the athletes for the "good of the team." Corporate superiors and subordinates become "sensitized" to each other (if the budget permits such training), but the former then must decide which of the latter are to be promoted or dismissed. Hierarchy stands in the way everywhere; it makes feudalism, post-feudalism, and a combination of the two equally intolerable. For example, we cannot repersonalize even the two-person family unless we abandon the concept of hierarchy.
For GST, then, to adopt hierarchy as one of its organic laws is to ' "It ought . to be plain that command depends not on ownership but on the division of labor in detail . . . The command structure of a nationalized industry Is, in essentials, no whit different from that of private industry, hedged about though it invariably is by the trappings of constitutionaiism (joint consultation). It is at last plain to see that capitalism in industry is one thing, command in industry quite another." Graham Wootton, Workers, Unions, and the State (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), Ch. III. Wootton concludes Engels grasped this point; Marx did not. eliminate its usefulness as an operational theory of organizations. The social systems we know cannot become "communities" unless we abandon hierarchy or, alternatively, design an updated version of feudalism. We have come closer to the latter than we are prone to think; everyday jargon is full of phrases such as "the old man" and "the organizational family," which imply patriarchy. Sometimes we think about using conventional models of "democracy" in organizations to get around this, as in worker self-management schemes. But, if workers are to "elect" their managers, this can only reinforce "role" and mechanistic concepts. Thus, even representative government as we knew it seems incompatible with GST, but the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable goes on. When we turn to concreteness and survival, things get worse.
Concreteness and System Survival
GST advocates have sought to make the "wholeness" of the individual compatible with organizational "wholeness"; among others, Bertalanffy has made much of the active personality system as a new "model of man" [15, pp. 192-193] . However, organizational survival tends to emphasize the integrity of the single organization, and it introduces a determinism which inevitably reduces the individual to a position of lesser importance. Given their addiction to the hierarchical ordering of systems, GST proponents almost inadvertently have sacrificed the individual for the sake of the larger system, something that is clearest cf all where nation-states are concerned.
The nation-state stands virtually alcne as the human organization which has the wherewithal to bring to bear every conceivable instrument of violence to insure its own survival and growth. Bertrand Russell, noting that any organization is an "organism, with a life of its own, and a tendency to growth and decay," added that the nation-state had an "instinct for selfpreservation" [10, pp. 157-158] . Others, concerned with the future of the United States, have observed that "America is not exempted from the historical imperatives, the laws of life and decay" [12, p. 52). Those seeking a general theory of international politics (only another general theory of organizations) concluded that it is only empirically realistic that individuals of different philosophies (Acheson and Dulles, Churchill, and Bevin) pursued the same foreign policies [14] . Despite the gloomy Hcbbesian (Theory X) view of human nature, there is reason to think the violence used to insure nation-state survival is not a reflection of natural man at all, but is learned behavior which the larger system forces upon him."* For this reason, it 'Roderic Gorney, The Human Agenda (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, 1972), Ch. 3. While I would not want to overstate the argument here, it seems possible we have been overpopularizing the notion that all animais, including man, are inherently aggressive and prone to destroying each other for the sake of preserving "territoriality," etc., and Konrad Lorenz and Robert Ardrey have become almost household words. Gorney's argument, to the contrary, is that animals of the same species are by nature cooperative, and that only man has devised systems which make organized vioience seem "naturai" within a species. If the hierarchical orders of other animals are more "feudaiistic," they are iess destructive of themselves.
seems to me, students of international politics (and some GST adherents as well) have shied away from GST implications.
Scholars who lived through the Hitler years in Europe, especially those who came to the United States and exerted a profound influence on intellectual trends here, came to fear that organismic thinking had provided a normative conceptual framework for Germanic notions of nationalism, patriotism, and Lebensraum, the doctrine that the 1000-year Reich inevitably was destined to spread across the heartland of Eurasia. One example is Hans Morgenthau's theory of international politics, based on clear definitions of such phenomena as "national interest" and "national character." Having flirted with essentially organismic concepts, Morgenthau then disavowed organicism, arguing that power itself was a purely psychological relationship between the minds of individuai men [5] . Bertalanffy himself raised the same problem, arguing that to view the nation-state as an "organism on a superordinate level" was to provide the "foundation for a totalitarian state, within which the human individual appears to be an insignificant cell in an organism or an unimportant worker in a beehive" [15, p. 35] . This problem hardly is limited to the nation-state.
To echo Sheldon Wolin's complaint of 12 years ago, huge formal organizations such as General Motors, the Pentagon, and public universities, engage themselves in forms of violence which are only less obvious, not less threatening, to their members and to others affected by them [16] . Philip Selznick remains the most articulate of organismic theorists, and his approach to institutional survival and cohesion places those values well above all ethers. For the individual corporation, the economic concept of "externalities" has played a major part in permitting us to avoid the implications of organismic thinking. Any costs, social costs in particular, that can be transferred to some other organization or to society as a whole, are perceived to be cf no concern tc the corporation. Those of us assigned to universities should be more aware than we are of how this works; those denied tenure, often because of budgetary restrictions alone, are for practical purposes being declared unemployable fcr life because the entire market is tight. Those cf us whc remain inside accept cur incremental pay raises each year while remaining largely unconcerned about the fate cf these newly defined "externalities." Everyday determinism is inccrpcrated in such phrases as "I'm scrry, but you must be fired fcr the gcod cf the organization." GST, in other words, enccurages us to accept pretty much as "givens" the basic outlines cf social systems as we find them, because cf the assumption that whatever we see is largely the result cf a "natural" evolution. This can introduce fundamental contradictions, and I know of no better example than economics.
The Mechanistic Tradition of Economics
In the classical mechanistic worldview, all phenomena in the world were perceived as the products of chance, of the aimless play of atoms governed by inexorable laws cf causality [15, p. 45] . Adam Smith was indeed one of the classic thinkers in this tradition, although we have given this less attention than we should. The equilibrium model of the "unseen hand" remains as good an example as we have of the nonrational mechanistic system. While few wculd argue that "perfect competition" ever has been achieved anywhere, it remains a driving ideal cf eccncmics; many of us still assume that as a theory, it is logically coherent. It is not, and that is why it never has delivered on its premises, cannot new deliver, and never will deliver. Tc examine the logic cf competition is to understand why.
In a perfectly competitive market, all companies have an interest in a higher price, but no company can set prices higher than its competitors. Each company also wants tc sell as much as it can, and it increases its output as long as the cost of producing each new unit is less than the market price. Increasing cutput dees net represent a cemmen interest, fcr the mere units ether cempanies sell, the lewer the price and inceme fer any given firm. Yet each company continues te preduce because, by definitien, its eutput alone has ne effect en the market. If ene cempany, cerrectly estimating that the eutput ef all firms cannet be seld at a price which will yield prefits fer all, acts te reduce its eutput, this enly makes things werse for that cempany; its ewn inceme falls aleng with all the ethers. What this means is that the "equilibrium" ef classic cempetitien cannet eccur in any situatien ether than ene ef censtantly and infinitely increasing demand. Unless this is present, in the ferm ef custemers willing and able te buy the eutput, prices fall until preducers cannot recever their cests. The dewnward spiral and the accempanying sccial chaes are arrested only by gevernment assistance in the ferm ef price supperts, tariffs, or quotas [8, pp. 9-10] . "Perfect cempetitien," in ether words, is a legical impessibility.
The typical example is agriculture-we have plewed creps under, stered eur overpreducticn, paid farmers net te farm, and previded price supperts. The typical sequence cempleted its cycle in the egg industry in 1972. High prices in 1969 and 1970 enceuraged farmers te steck up en hens in anticipation ef high prefits; the market was glutted 2 years later, eggs ceuld net be seld fer what it cest te preduce them, and the gevernment faced a choice ameng undesirable alternatives. One ef them, the widespread and subsidized slaughter ef hens, narrewly was defeated in the Senate, and the search fer semething better was renewed. New, surely we can define a "market" (preducers and censumers ef a preduct) as a "system," but it is ene which, by eur definition ef it, is collectively nonrational, fcr we define it as enly the aggregate cf ceuntiess individual and iselated decisiens made by preducers and censumers.
To put it mildly, this poses a problem for organization theorists who count themselves as followers of GST. The individual organization searches for its own "purpose," presumably through some form of "rational" analysis, but within a larger system which must remain nonrational by definition. The organic system (corporation) is part of a mechanistic supersystem (market); we can effect an overall outcome in the larger system (by stimulating purchasing power), but what happens to a single producer cannot be the outcome of conscious planning. And so it is; we invent explanations of "efficiency" and "inefficiency" to distinguish between companies which "succeed" and others that "fail," but this inherent systemic tendency toward overproduction and social chaos makes the failure of an individual company an essentially random event. It is only a little better in market systems dominated by a few companies, the oligopolies; while they manage to restrain production to what can be sold, with the aid of government stimulation, their market systems are not explicitly planned ones, for we have a network of public policies and conceptual thinking which defines the planning of production (by companies producing the same thing) as conspiracy.
We may be on the verge of discovering why it is that the "equilibrium" postulated by theories of perfect competition always has been impossible to realize. Economists have tended not to analyze market systems (microeconomics, the subfield which deals with markets, concentrates on the single firm because that is the only planning unit), and GST proponents, usually "renaissance men" who range widely in many fields, have tended to follow this lead (while not questioning the conventional wisdom of their original field). This has been comfortable up to now, because the anomalies of economic competition have been obscured by the presumed "success" of continued growth. But, what if growth must cease or be severely curtailed?
Systems, Growth, and the Future
Growth stands on the threshold of becoming the greatest global issue in at least a century; the forthcoming dialogue will make it clear that no country will be affected more than this one, and few theories will be affected more than GST as we have known it up to now with respect to social systems. A Secretary of the Treasury, President Nixon's chief administrator of our massively revised economic policies, found it necessary early in 1972 to use the forum of a White House Conference to reject the concept of "zero net growth," for the President's program required growth-especially in the automobile industry [6] . However, only a few weeks later, the same President's principal environmental adviser, admitting his speech "might make some waves," used an out-of-town podium to call for a "national debate on the desirability of limiting growth" [7] . Those versed in the art of evaluating "trial balloons" were left to ponder if one or both statements had been cleared in advance with the White House. What seems reasonably certain (as this is written in August 1972) is that beth Presidential candidates will avoid the issue during the campaign. Net enly is it unmanageable at a time when many worry about unempleyment figures, but we have ne conceptual framewerk for dealing with it. Yet, it seems likely that the victorieus candidate will have to deal with the issue in 1973 and probably will set in meticn by 1974 policies designed te restrain grewth-and all this after having wen the election partly en the basis ef premises te increase grewth.
There is no space here to survey the burgeoning literature on the problems ef grewth; suffice it to note that pelitical scientists and economists, not to mention organization theorists, have been avoiding the issue because their cenventional wisdoms cannet cope with it. While GST casually has mentiened "growth, maturity, and decay" for years, little more than that has been done; the implicit assumption usually is that these let go by one system (e.g., the university) will be accommodated by growth of the larger system. The best summary statement of the problem facing us has been produced by a distinguished group of British intellectuals [13] :
The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sustainable. Its termination within the lifetime of someone born today is lnevitable-;-unless it continues to be sustained for a while longer by an entrenched minority at the cost of imposing great suffering upon the rest of mankind. We can be certain, however, that sooner or later it will end (only the precise time and circumstances are in doubt), and that it will do so in one of two ways: either against our will, in a succession of famines, epidemics, social crises and wars; or because we want it to-because we wish to create a society which will not impose hardship and cruelty upon our children-in a succession of thoughtful, humane, and measured changes. We believe that a growing number of people are aware of this choice, and are more interested in our proposals for creating a sustainable society than in yet another recitation of the reasons why this should not be done.
There will indeed be a "systems" debate, but it will turn en the question of whether the planet Earth can be cenceptualized as a "clesed" or "open" system. Advocates ef the latter approach will attempt te keep our attention riveted en outer space; they will lure us with the newest version of the frontier philosophy which will tempt us te anticipate celenizatien ef other planets. The "clesed" system prepenents will respend that even if other planets er galaxies are inhabitable, the ecenemic grewth on Earth required te make the voyages weuld have the effect ef destroying us while our own space vehicles are enreute te new destinatiens. It is net immediately necessary te take a pesitien en the questien ef Earth as a "clesed" er "open" system. We prebably must cenceptualize seme degree ef epenness if we are te take into acceunt the probability that seme ef eur internal technological activities might damage the "nature" ef the universe, quite aside from the questien ef celenizing space. The peint is that in narrewing the definitien ef "externalities," we have ne cheice but te think of the consequences ef eur decisiens for everything and everybody. How might we appreach this task?
The perspective argued here is that GST is enly a reductienist version of a larger stream ef theught, and that the reductionism has distorted beyond
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recognition that larger view. Te seme extent this is the eutceme ef academic specializatien, fer mest ef us spend our lifetimes looking at things which by any cemmen-sense definitien are enly parts ef seme larger whole. When we examine interdependence within these parts (as GST enceurages us te de within fermal crganizatiens), we everleek the interdependence between the parts-cenceptualized as the interdependencies within the larger system. Seme ef eur weightiest thinkers have contributed te this reductienism because, I think, they have placed tee high a value en mathematical precisien. Fer example, Karl Deutsch, seeking te rise abeve the limitatiens ef classic models ef mechanism and erganism, nevertheless cemplains that the wide-ranging "precess" thinkers (Kant, Hegel, Marx, Teynbee) have previded us with medels lacking "inner structure and quantitative predictability" [2, p. 79]. However this is disceunted by probabilities, it remains a lenging fer seme ferm ef determinism. Yet, it seems te me that precess medels are the enly enes Vi/hich offer the hepe ef identifying the "whele" and, while it may seem difficult te believe at first, ene ef the classic precess thinkers belengs te the medern histery ef erganizatien theery-Mary Parker Fellett.
In her clearest example ef interdependence and precess thinking, Fellett described the interactien ef a tennis game. When ene player serves and the ether returns, the third stroke is determined net only by the second but, at least in part, by the nature ef the original serve. Each new streke becemes a cempesite histery ef all previeus enes, in the fermula she described as "l-plus-the-interweaving-between-yeu-and-me, meeting yeuplus-the-interweaving-between-ycu-and-me, etc.," and she censtantly invented werds in the attempt te describe what she had in mind. Ameng these werds were the terms interweaving, interpenetrating, interlacing, interknitting, intermingling, reciprecal respense, and activity-between.*^ "I am an individual," she argued, "net se far as I am apart frem, but as far as I am a part ef ether men" [3, p. 62] . This led her te define leyalty as semething net given by ene persen te anether, but as semething beth give te the "whele," the "situatien," the "relation" which includes the twe. "Autherity" in any greup precess was semething inherent enly te the precess, situatien, er relatien, net an individual [3, p. 59] . Everything, in ether werds, is part ef semething else.
Te leek at things "relatienally" is te return te a line ef thinking mentiened semetimes, but net eften, in GSTf it is mere traceable te Hegel,
•^For a summary of Follett's thinking which includes the tennis example, see Elliot M. Fox, "Mary Pari<er Follett: The Enduring Contribution," Pubiic Administration Review, XXVIII (November/December 1968), pp. 520-529.
"Both "relation" and "process" are mentioned, e.g., in Walter Buckley, "Society as a Complex Adaptive System," In his (ed). Modern Systems Research for the Behaviorai Scientist (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 490-513. In this treatment, however, concepts of "competition," "cooperation," and "conflict," are dealt with as though they were equally valid. This reflects, I think, the tendency of GST proponents to be somewhat less normative than they should be. Simply to accept "competition" as a potential universal is, by implication, to assume war between nation-states as a given.
Leibniz, and Spinoza. If, in Hegel's words, "knowledge can be only set forth fully ... in the form of a system," and if Spinoza built upon Aristotle's definition of "substance" as that which is capable of independent existence, then the only definable "whole" is something on the order of "substance," "nature," or "God." This worldview requires an observer to change from perceiving relatively independent factors or organisms related to each other to perceiving the particular way in which all these factors or organisms are related to each other within each one cf them; "to conceive of things as 'relations' is simply to interiorize this interdependence in the thing itself."^ If this seems at first glance a monumental task, it need not be, but it requires an abrupt departure from the almost inadvertent reductionism of GST. Organismic theorists tend to use the "system-environment" dichotomy in ways which "overconcretize" the single system (organization) while overgeneralizing its relations with other systems, and without taking into account how those other systems actually function within the single system. Some relatively simple examples are in order.
1. As implied earlier, GST advocates are wide-ranging and interdisciplinary, but only up to a point. They tend not to question the premises of the several disciplines with which they attempt to work and, as Harold Sprout once said in my presence, they do not meet the full requirements of interdisciplinary activity. To do that, he said, one "must get fully inside the mind of another." GST thinkers have yet to challenge, confront, and come completely to grips with the assumptions of all the disciplines they use, including their individual disciplines. For example, among "systems thinkers," Deutsch does not really question at length the premises of conventional politics, nor does Boulding question those of conventional economics. 2. Biologists, and all those concerned with the environment for that matter, are learning that "food-chain" conceptualizations are far more significant than patterns within any single species. The catch phrase, "you are what you eat" may be intellectually significant, and economists and environmentalists may discover together that the threatened extinction of whales (an international scandal) is traceable to the systemic nature of competitive economics. 3. All of us in administration, especially public administration, are well aware of the "interagency committee," the "task force," or the "temporary organization" for that matter. What we fail to conceptualize is that if, say, five individuals come together from five agencies to form such a group, each individual actually functions within six organizational systems; he is a member of his permanent organization, the committee, etc., as well as the other four permanent systems. From an organization theery perspective, then, the beginning points are not all that difficult to describe. We should proceed with the explicit articulation of what might be termed transorganizational systems; this amounts to extrapolating the organizational diagrams of, say, Rensis Likert, to the larger universe of which they are parts, and beginning to cenceptualize the innumerable interactions within and between systems.* It is as if we visualized a map ef the werld which contained none of the nation-state boundaries with which we are familiar, or for that matter none of the pyramidal organizational charts within which we live (and are repressed). We then would draw on the globe all of the systems we could •discover. We might find ourselves viewing "millions of cobwebs" overlapping and penetrating each other, each system describable as a cluster ot relations between systems [1, pp. 8, 15, and 45). This is emerging in the study of international politics as the concept of transnationalism and, •without something like it, we cannot even begin to deal with such phenomena as multinational corporations. In this far-reaching enterprise, GST cannot help-at least not in its present form.
I do not suggest for a moment that all those who consider themselves to be general system(s) theorists would acknowledge this assessment of what they do a valid one. They form too disparate a group to be labeled as subscribing to a monolithic point of view. Yet, their search for universals has led them all too quickly to adopt a somewhat deterministic outlook which, combined with their acceptance of such notions as hierarchy and competition as "laws," can be dangerous. Seme of them recognize as much; Ervin Laszio worries that the development ef "higher level supersystems in the sociocultural sphere" may, if it leads to a single unit world, •leave individuals "more and more deeply imbedded in complex hierarchical structures." He rejects this outcome, of course, on grounds that man cannot be "natural" (in the way Laszio would prefer man to be "natural") in such circumstances. So, insists Laszio, correlations between inputs and outputs cannot be conceptualized as "deterministic" ones. While certain functions will have to be carried out, it will be left te "volunteers" to fulfill them; the "system as a whole" is determinate, but the "relationships of the parts" is not [4, pp. 111-113] . Thus, the fatal flaws of GST stand clearly outlined.
In organizational terms, nothing could be more familiar. "Volunteers" are free to participate in carrying out the decisions made by others. It simply is assumed that every individual's choice will add up to some form of collective rationality and purpose. In attempting to escape the implications of hierarchy, GST propels us backward into the old mechanistic «Likert's draft MS for his next book, which I have had the privilege of perusing, indicates that Likert now thinks in terms of ail sorts of systems, not only corporations; Ihe end product may include designs for universities, major urban areas, and the like. In effect, Likert's draft MS contains a political theory. tradition from which it promised us escape. Indeed, Laszlo's prescription is nothing more than a shorthand version of market economics, the most mechanistic model of all. Yet the growth crisis will be resolvable only by conceptualizing and then operationalizing global market systems, and not competitive ones, on a product-by-product basis. The objective is the survival of all, not merely some, and all must share in that undertaking. After all, the GST approach offers us-in the final analysis-the grim pursuit of our own death, and some ef the "laws" it has accepted up te new seem guaranteed te make that predictien ceme true. Even the old mechanistic approach is better than that, and so we must continue the search for the humanism we cannot find except, perhaps, in process thinking. For those of us in the United States, it is worth pondering that from this perspective, our "advanced" culture is more primitive than that of the Indians we displaced. There is a systems approach!
